

PAPR 2025

POINT ANNUEL DES PAYS À RISQUES

THE SSF ANNUAL REPORT ON HIGH-RISK COUNTRIES

Summary of alerts – Countries to monitor
Regional analysis – Calendar

Preface

In 2025, the **anticipation and the detection of early warning signs** will remain key to managing security in the face of a **process of deconstruction** of the world order inherited from 1945.

Wars in Ukraine, the Middle East and Sudan, as well as natural disasters, political and social crises and elections are changing the international balance of power. **The instability and uncertainty** into which the world was plunged in 2024 will affect businesses at every level: first and foremost, the **safety of their employees**, but also **the continuity and even sustainability of their activities**. When it comes to travel, high-risk areas have particularly grown in the Middle East and Africa.

With unique experience in the risk prevention and management market, Scutum Security First (SSF) offers its customers **a comprehensive, coherent and proactive approach** to help them deal with a multi-crisis situation, or even a permacrisis, that is set to continue into 2025.

In 2024, the SSF monitoring department issued around **11,000 safety-security alerts**, up some 10%

in comparison to 2023. Meanwhile, out of the 208 countries and territories covered by our monitoring service, our analysts also downgraded the **overall security assessment** of around fifteen of them. Each month, our **PMPR** report on high-risk countries highlights 10 countries to monitor and identifies the notable events over the next month.

In addition, **our regional news bulletins** provide weekly coverage of the key events in our customers' key areas of interest, whether security-related, or concerning political, economic, social, health or climate issues. We have also **introduced enhanced monitoring** to provide more specific support to our customers in **crisis management**, particularly in Lebanon and Mayotte, or for the **organisation of their major events** (sports competitions, international conferences, general meetings, etc.).

Our extensive network of **contacts on the ground**, combined with **our in-depth expertise** and command of dedicated **data mining** and **artificial intelligence (AI)** tools, have enabled us to meet the specific needs of each of our customers, whether in preparing trips, securing projects and events, training staff or managing crises that have affected their activities.

The uncertainty and growing impact of geopolitical risks on the travel and activities of operators require **finer, more reliable tools for anticipation and analysis**. This is all the more strategic at a time when **disinformation is on the rise**, and the issues surrounding the **use of AI as a tool for geopolitical destabilisation are becoming ever more important**. There is also a growing risk that companies will be harmed by the disinformation wars waged by various public and private players.

Alongside these challenges and the instabilities mentioned at international level, the reconfigurations underway are also creating **new prospects** (areas of travel, innovative markets, changes in policies). In the wake of geopolitical upheavals that are increasingly sudden and difficult to predict, situations that have long stood still are **likely to evolve rapidly** in 2025, opening up new horizons in an international business environment that is being completely redefined.



CONTENTS

2024 summary of SSF alerts	4
10 countries to monitor	5
SSF Risk Map – countries and & areas	6
Regional Analysis	
Sub-Saharan Africa	7
North Africa & the Middle East	9
The Americas	11
Asia-Pacific	13
Europe & CIS	15
2025 Calendar	17
Elections and important deadlines	18

2024 summary of alerts



+ 11,000 alerts
+ 400 classified critical or
urgent

In 2024, SSF issued a total of **11,007 safety-security alerts**, concerning all kinds of risks, in order to inform its customers of the latest events likely to have an impact on their interests and the safety or security of their employees.


Around 400 of the alerts sent were of a critical or urgent level. Alerts classified as urgent activate our 24-hour **Security Operations Centre (SOC)**.

Following on from 2023, the proportion of alerts linked to **conflicts and armed violence remains** high in several regions of the world (MENA, Africa, North and South America, Europe). The proportion of alerts dealing with **climate** and **socio-political** risks has remained stable overall on a global scale, but increased significantly in certain regions in 2024, such as in **Europe** for climate risks and in **Asia** for socio-political risks.

GEOGRAPHIC DISTRIBUTION



TYPE OF RISK




10 countries to monitor



Israel and the Palestinian Territories, Lebanon, Russia, Mexico, Pakistan, Nigeria, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Colombia, Kenya and Brazil are the countries that accounted for the highest number of alerts sent by SSF in 2024. In total, these 10 countries generated **2,384 safety-security alerts**, representing **21%** of all the alerts sent over the course of 2024.


Countries engaged in long-term warfare or with extremely high levels of insecurity in general (Afghanistan, Libya, Syria, Sudan, Yemen, Somalia and Ukraine) have been deliberately excluded from the list, in addition to countries that do not pose any specific safety risks but do generate a large number of alerts (USA, France, etc.).



Number of alerts issued in 2024 and main risk factor according to country



Risk Map / countries & areas



/ Sub-Saharan Africa

A two-tier continent: from **peaceful transitions to democratic collapse** and a **deteriorating security situation**

As a **strategic election year**, 2024 marked a turning point for several countries on the continent. Some countries saw political normalisation or continuity (Chad, Rwanda, Comoros), or peaceful transition/change (Namibia, Botswana, South Africa, Ghana, Senegal, Mauritius), after a period of uncertainty for some. Elsewhere elections were either **not held or were postponed (Burkina Faso, South Sudan, Mali and Guinea)**. Across the continent, **southern Africa** remains relatively untouched by political and security turmoil, with the exception of **Mozambique**, which has been facing a persistent terrorist threat in the north and a **major post-election crisis since October**.

In contrast, leadership crises, an escalation in socio-political tensions and a deteriorating security situation have particularly affected countries in **West/Central Africa** (Mali, Niger, Burkina Faso, Guinea and, to a lesser extent, Gabon and Chad). In addition to **diplomatic tension** between Western partners and the region's military regimes, 2024 saw the emergence of a rift between 'pro' and 'anti' ECOWAS countries in West Africa itself, with **indirect security consequences**

(Benin/Niger border, deterioration in regional anti-terrorist cooperation which benefited jihadist groups in coastal countries). This situation has also increased the **exposure of certain foreign operators**, both in terms of the security of their assets and their relations with local authorities. Such weaknesses are also being exploited by foreign powers that are increasingly involved in military operations, the exploitation of economic resources and interference on the continent (Russia, China, Türkiye, Iran).

It is also worth noting the persistence of **crises with regional implications** in **Central and East Africa**, which have led to a deterioration in diplomatic relations (Sudan/Chad; Rwanda/DRC). As a result, the **socio-humanitarian impact** (refugees, displaced persons) is growing in these areas, with the potential to cause lasting disruption to local social structures (Sudan, Nigeria, Mali, DRC, Burkina Faso, Cameroon). These areas are also under threat **from severe pressure on resources** and the **increasing violence of seasonal weather patterns**.

The **polarisation of African societies** is also becoming more pronounced, especially with an online generation of young people, who have been marginalised economically and **reject both political elites and**

traditional partners, and who are likely to rally in large numbers through the use of social media (Kenya, Nigeria).

In terms of health, the epidemic of the new **Mpox** variant has mainly affected countries in **Central Africa**, with no major impact on travel and with a marked slowdown in the infection rate observed at the end of 2024, following the launch of vaccination campaigns.




The heads of state of Mali, Niger and Burkina Faso attend the first summit of the Alliance of Sahel States (ASS) in July 2024

Sub-Saharan Africa


To monitor in 2025: ongoing areas of instability, rifts and new opportunities

- The **reconfiguration of the internal and geopolitical balance of power in the region** could generate new business opportunities for operators (new attractive destinations, increased activity in the energy transition and infrastructure markets). While the election of Donald Trump is unlikely to have a significant impact on security on the continent, the possible **reduction in US sectoral economic support** could benefit other powers.
- There are a number of potentially **sensitive strategic elections** to monitor in 2025: in **Cameroon** (succession to President Biya and the challenge of unity), in **Togo** (confirmation of the extension of the regime), in the **Ivory Coast** (a new democratic test), in **Tanzania** (confirmation or otherwise of the opening of the regime amid growing tension between the government and the opposition) and uncertain/double-edged **end-of-transition elections (Guinea, Gabon)**.

- The development of some conflicts could bring about lasting changes in the regional security landscape, particularly in **Sudan**, where there is a risk of widespread violence with regional repercussions, given that the conflict is being fuelled by foreign powers (UAE, Chad, Egypt, Russia, Iran) and the possibility of a US withdrawal; in the **Sahel, with a jihadist surge** putting cities and border areas (Benin, Senegal and Guinea) at greater risk; the stagnation of the conflict in the **east of the DRC** and a potential worsening of relations with Rwanda; along with **growing tension between Somalia and Ethiopia**, likely to heighten instability in the Horn of Africa.



© OpenStreetMap contributors



Map of security trends forecast in 2024

Map: Scutum Security First (SSF) - Created with Datawrapper

/ MENA

A year marked by **structural changes**: can high-cost wars bring lasting change?

The past year has been marked by **two major turning points**, which will continue to shape a **new regional strategic balance** in 2025, following the increasing regionalisation of the conflict in the Gaza Strip, driven by a front in support of Hamas described as the “Axis of Resistance” founded and organised by Iran.


Firstly, **Israel's offensive against Hezbollah in Lebanon** from September 2024 onwards (beeper and walkie-talkie attacks 17 & 18 September, a massive aerial bombing campaign on Southern Lebanon 23 September and the elimination of Hassan Nasrallah 27 September) created major shockwaves that began to **erode Iran's strategic hold in the Middle East**. The onslaught did not spare **Bashar al-Assad's regime in Syria**, whose major military and logistical sites linked to the Iranian Revolutionary Guards and Hezbollah were repeatedly targeted by Israeli strikes throughout 2024.

In a similar fashion, the **Syrian rebel lightning offensive from Idlib carried out by Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS)** led to the fall of Bashar al-Assad's regime 8 December 2024. This second major turning point further exacerbated **Iran's regional uprooting**, paving the way for a structural reconfiguration of the strategic balance of power in the Middle East, which is set to

begin in early 2025. In this respect, the **9 January election of Joseph Aoun** as the new president of Lebanon testifies to the **return of Saudi** (and Western) **influence** in the country, at the expense of pro-Iranian groups.

Meanwhile, in a similar fashion to his first term in office (2016-2020), **Donald Trump's return to power** heralds a **shift in regional focus towards the strategic interests of Israel and the Gulf states**.

In such a set-up, the **stability of the Iranian regime appears to be under threat**, although the possibility of a regional war between Israel and Iran is unlikely given the devastating costs it would entail at both a regional and international level. However, it is likely that action will be taken in the near future to **compel the Iranian regime to accept the new regional status quo**, whether by force or negotiation.



/ MENA

The reconfiguration of the balance of power **is likely to be a long and uneven road**

Significant crisis risks are emerging or being confirmed in the wake of the current reconfigurations, particularly regarding:

- The **future of the Palestinian cause** in Arab societies, most of which are hostile to any form of normalisation with Israel in the absence of a Palestinian State, the political plan of which is currently being shattered by the precarious nature of the ceasefire in the Gaza Strip and the increase in violence in the West Bank;
- The **risk of Kurdish regional unity collapsing** as a result of political infighting in Iraqi Kurdistan and Türkiye's efforts to dissociate the Syrian branch (PYD and YPG) of the Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK) from the PKK itself, through the use of force and talks;
- **The threat of territorial division hanging over Syria**, where the new government has been weakened from the outset by **foreign interference** (Türkiye, Qatar, Israel and the US in particular) and **security vacuums** that are likely to strengthen

certain armed groups, such as the autonomous Druze rebels in the south, the Islamic State group in the desert around Palmyra and the pro-Turkish factions of the Syrian National Army (SNA), which are fighting the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF, dominated by the Kurdish YPG in the northeast of the country).

- The **risks associated with Iran's strategic weakening**, particularly in **Iraq**, where pro-Iran Shiite militias maintain a central political and security influence, as well as in **Yemen**, where the **Houthi** government is threatened with isolation (already brought about by Israeli strikes on port, airport and energy infrastructure).
- In North Africa, **Morocco's** diplomatic efforts to have its sovereignty over the Western Sahara recognised are likely to continue to frustrate Algiers in its strategy of openness on the international stage. Such growing regional rivalries are compounded by volatile security environments on the doorstep of North Africa, particularly in **Libya** where **inter-militia clashes** are recurrent despite repeated ceasefires, and in the Sahel where instability once again is threatening **southern Algeria**, which in recent weeks has been the scene of **violent incidents targeting European nationals**

(the murder of a Swiss woman in Djanet in October and the kidnapping of a Spanish national near Tamanrasset in January 2025).

- In **Tunisia**, the trend of the **regime tightening its grip on the political arena** was confirmed in October with the unsurprising re-election of President **Kais Saied** in a ballot marked by **harsh repression** and a lack of democratic conditions. The **risk of social unrest** stemming from the country's **serious socio-economic and financial crisis** is also a cause for concern, while the opposition and civil society are increasingly silenced.



/ The Americas

Latin America: **election crises, diplomatic tension, security challenges** and **social protests**

In 2024, the Latin American political scene was split between a form of continuity and a certain polarisation of forces. General elections were held **smoothly and seamlessly**, with the re-election of Nayib Bukele in **El Salvador** (still under a prolonged state of emergency), Luis Abinader in the **Dominican Republic**, José Raul Mulino in **Panama** and Yamandu Orsi in **Uruguay**.

Conversely, other elections gave rise to **much more troubled situations**, notably in **Venezuela**, where the **result is still being contested** by the international community (including Brazil and Colombia, with whom relations have become frosty) and the opposition.

In **Mexico**, organised crime weighed heavily on the federal election campaign, the bloodiest in the country's history. The new president, Claudia Sheinbaum, has since begun to adjust her **strategy to combat drug-trafficking**, which is a cross between a soft approach and the open warfare of her predecessors.


In **Brazil**, the municipal and regional elections in October showed a significant breakthrough for the moderate right, in contrast to the expected tidal wave for the far right in a **polarised environment**, revealing potential internal divisions in the political base of former President Jair Bolsonaro.

In **Colombia**, President Gustavo Petro's policy of "total peace" has been undermined by new **outbreaks of violence** and a lack of concrete progress, losing the support of public opinion.

In **Haiti**, gang violence has created a climate of **acute insecurity**, leading to large-scale population movements. The international mission led by the Kenyan police has failed to stem the violence, just as the transition government has failed to consolidate a stable institutional base.

On a regional scale, **large-scale social unrest** continues to be a recurring feature. In **Peru**, it took the form of mass strikes by public transport companies following a wave of extortion attacks, particularly in Lima in September.

2024 was also marked by the **high cost of weather-related hazards**, illustrated by **hurricanes Milton and Helene, flooding** in southern Brazil and **fires** in Los Angeles and the Amazon (the area of vegetation destroyed by fires in Brazil increased by 79% over the year, reaching 30.8 million hectares).



/ The Americas

Political reconfigurations and uncertainties for the dawn of the new Donald Trump era

Donald Trump's return to the White House is likely to result in an **escalation of the trade war with China** affecting the region, as well as a **reconfiguration of regional relations and tensions** - particularly with **Mexico** over economic and migration issues; with **Panama** over the canal; and with **Honduras**, which is threatening to close US bases on its soil if its nationals are expelled from the United States en masse. On a broader scale, the US president has also **threatened to cut off access to the US market for BRICS+** countries, under the current presidency of Brazil, unless they use the dollar, which could either hinder or encourage the group to develop alternatives for emancipation.

On the other hand, **Argentina** led by Javier Milei has been bolstered in its **policy of rapprochement with Washington**. Scheduled for October, Argentina's upcoming **legislative elections** will serve as a referendum on the president's ultra-liberal policies, which combine macroeconomic stabilisation with social costs.

2025 will provide an opportunity to **gauge the impact of political and electoral trends that have been present since 2023**, such as the rise of anti-establishment candidates (Javier Milei, Nayib Bukele) and the consolidation of authoritarian regimes (Venezuela, Nicaragua).

General elections are scheduled amid an **uncertain and conflict-ridden international environment**, marked by a general decline in purchasing power and rising levels of insecurity that are heightening **social frustration**.

In **Ecuador**, as in 2023, Daniel Noboa will be up against the opposition, led by Luisa Gonzalez, with a **persistent security and energy crisis**, as well as confrontation within the executive power looming in the background.

In **Bolivia**, the run-up to the elections is likely to be peppered by further large-scale political rallies, with a **significant risk of clashes** due to the partisan rivalry between Luis Arce and Evo Morales within the Movement Towards Socialism (MAS), which is in a hegemonic position in the face of a divided opposition.

In **Chile**, the failure of the constitutional reform process and the 2022 presidential election have



shaped the **old coalitions** in the face of **emerging political players**. Gabriel Boric's weakened left-wing camp will go up against Evelyn Matthei's centre-right.

In **Honduras**, still reeling from **corruption scandals**, the presidential election will see the National Party (PN), in turmoil due to the infiltration of organised crime cartels, pitted against the Liberal Party (PL) and the Libertad y Refundacion (Libre) party of current President Xiomara Castro.

Meanwhile, Justin Trudeau's resignation has plunged **Canada** into a **period of uncertainty**, as Donald Trump steps up his provocation and economic threats aimed at the country. The divided Liberal Party faces a strengthened Conservative opposition and the left-wing New Democratic Party (NDP).

The **leadership crisis** is still ongoing in **Haiti** following the dismissal of Prime Minister Garry Conille and his contested replacement by businessman Alix Didier Fils-Aimé in November 2024 by the Transitional Presidential Council. The Haitian authorities have announced a constitutional referendum and presidential elections by the beginning of 2026, goals that seem unrealistic at this stage.

/ Asia-Pacific (APAC)

Deteriorating pre-existing sources of instability and uncertainty amid continued regional competition between China and the United States

Contributing to regional instability, China has stepped up its **military manoeuvres in the South China Sea**, with an increase in clashes with the Philippines since the summer of 2024. Manila has responded to these incidents in a more committed manner than in the past and has strengthened its military ties with the Western Bloc, but this alliance seems more dependent than ever on the evolution of regional competition between the United States and China under the new Trump administration. The year was also marked by the increased Chinese naval presence in the **Taiwan Strait** (and Western in response) following the inauguration of Taiwanese President Lai Ching-Te, illustrating major persistent tensions over the Taiwan issue.

On the **Korean Peninsula**, tensions between North and South continued to escalate, with no prospect of improvement in the short term. 2024 began with a surprise speech by North Korean leader Kim Jong Un, in which he abandoned North Korea's decades-old policy of peaceful unification with South Korea and

declared Seoul to be Pyongyang's main enemy. The year ended with Kim Jong-Un ratifying a mutual defence pact with Moscow and deploying thousands of North Koreans to fight alongside Russia against Ukraine, thus linking Pyongyang to European collective security issues.

On the one hand, the **2024 election year** in the APAC region contributed to an overall increase in corruption and in the influence of the military over the civilian powers in several countries, notably **Indonesia**, **Thailand** and above all **Pakistan**, which experienced an acute political crisis during the highly contested general elections in February, contributing to one of the most violent years in the country for more than a decade. Meanwhile, some civilian powers have been weakened by entering into coalition governments, as in **Thailand** and **India** (where Prime Minister Narendra Modi's BJP suffered an electoral setback), fostering uncertainty and paving the way for possible political crises over the course of 2025.

Countries with a stable security environment experienced considerable instability, notably in **Japan**, but especially in **South Korea**, with the president's failed attempt to impose martial law in December, triggering a period of unprecedented

political chaos without significantly altering the country's security environment or provoking a military escalation with North Korea.

What is more, the year also highlighted **the fragile nature of several civilian governments in countries facing major socio-economic challenges**, such as **Sri Lanka** (which saw political power change hands) and **Bangladesh**, which was affected by major unrest culminating in a revolution in the summer. The transition period has led to a relative improvement in the security situation, but developments are still marked by considerable uncertainty and the risk of a return to widespread socio-political unrest unless the socio-economic situation improves.



Asia-Pacific (APAC)

A region structured by the persistent threat from **insurgents and militant groups**


On a regional scale, the risk posed by insurgent and militant groups continues to be greatly heightened by major hotbeds of instability in **Myanmar** (still in the throes of civil war), **Pakistan** (where the threat from the TTP and Baluch separatist groups is growing) and **Afghanistan**.

Despite the Taliban's attempts to curb the threat, Afghanistan continues to be a haven for a number of radical Islamist groups that are not ideologically aligned with, or are even hostile to, the Taliban (TTP, ISKP, Al-Qaeda). These hotbeds of instability threaten the security of neighbouring countries first and foremost but have also enabled the groups to take action abroad (ISKP attack in Moscow in March). In addition, Western nationals and Chinese interests remain prime targets for such militant groups, especially in **Pakistan**, where the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) has been the target of several major attacks, reflecting the major tensions surrounding these investment projects and the key issue of the lack of economic returns for local populations.

To monitor in 2025

- **Increased regional competition between China and the United States**, with a renewed high-intensity trade war between the two countries. This polarisation will continue to have a huge influence on the domestic policies of the countries in the region and their economic and trade strategies. China is likely to increase its investments in South-East Asia in order to strengthen its regional influence and circumvent potential US sanctions, which will add to the pressure on these countries to side with Beijing, even if it means exposing themselves to US retaliation.
- Developments in the **civil war in Myanmar** and its regional impact, particularly on organised crime.
- Changes in the economic and political situation in **countries experiencing major socio-economic difficulties** (Pakistan, Sri Lanka, Bangladesh), leading to instability and distrust of governments. In Bangladesh, the elections scheduled in 2025 are likely to give rise to a new security crisis and violence.

- Rising tensions in the **Taiwan Strait** and the **South China Sea**, despite a limited risk of open conflict.



/ Europe & CIS

A regional security environment shaped by the **war in Ukraine** and **Russia's hybrid war**, and dependent on **developments in transatlantic relations** in the short and medium term

The conflict in Ukraine continues to be the main factor of instability for the European security environment. If 2022 was the year of the invasion and 2023 was the year of the stalemate on the front, 2024 was marked by the slow erosion of Ukrainian lines in favour of Russia, but also by the opening of a new front on Russian territory.

Beyond Ukraine, **Russia's hybrid war in Europe**, particularly in **Eastern Europe** and the **Caucasus**, has continued to fuel instability and crisis, and directly interferes with the life and democratic institutions of European countries. In **Georgia**, the re-election of the pro-Russian incumbent, where the election results were rejected by the pro-European opposition, led to a political and institutional crisis and widespread anti-government demonstrations. In **Bulgaria**, the political crisis persists after the seventh parliamentary elections since 2021 and while the new coalition formed at the beginning of 2025 remains fragile. In **Romania**, Russian electoral interference led

to the cancellation of the presidential election, provoking a major political crisis in the country. In neighbouring **Moldova**, the same accusations of Russian interference contributed to high levels of tension during the presidential election and the referendum on EU membership, both of which were narrowly won by the pro-European camp.

In the countries of **Northern Europe**, and particularly around the Baltic Sea, the Russian destabilisation campaign has been stepped up, with a growing number of incidents (sabotage of undersea and telecommunications cables, cyber attacks, espionage) fuelling fears for the security of these countries.

Furthermore, **tensions in the Balkans flared up again** at the end of 2024 between **Serbia** and **Kosovo** following an explosive attack on the Ibar-Lepenac canal, essential for supplying water to two thermal power stations in Zubin Potok (Kosovo), which was attributed by Pristina to groups supported by Belgrade. In addition, the Kosovo parliament speaker expelled a number of Serb minority MPs for repeated absences, a decision likely to heighten inter-ethnic tensions and further complicate the already fragile relations between Pristina and Belgrade, in the run-up to **Kosovo's legislative elections in February 2025**.

In **Western Europe**, the countries considered to be the driving forces of the European Union are going through phases of **governmental instability**. On the one hand in **France**, where the early legislative elections did not result in a clear winner and added to the political and leadership crisis, and on the other hand in **Germany**, where the government coalition led by Chancellor Olaf Scholz has collapsed. The political decline of Paris and Berlin contributes to the fragile position of the European Bloc in the global geopolitical arena, increasingly dictated by strategic competition between the United States and China and the direct threats to the regional security environment posed by Russia.




/ Europe & CIS

An increase in extreme weather events, with humanitarian and socio-economic consequences equally affecting travel

The continent was hit by major natural disasters, such as the floods that hit **Spain** at the end of October, causing more than 230 deaths and extensive damage, particularly in the region of Valencia. In September, storm Boris caused unprecedented flooding in vast areas of **Eastern and Central Europe** (Austria, Czech Republic, Poland, Romania, Slovakia, Hungary), resulting in at least 29 deaths.

To monitor in 2025

- **In Ukraine**, progress is expected towards a ceasefire that US President Donald Trump would like to seal. For Kyiv, the question is what kind of peace will emerge from a potential agreement with Moscow.
- **Developments in the European Bloc's plans for autonomy**, particularly in terms of collective security, in view of the competition between the United States and China, and in the face of Russia's hybrid war.
- **The threat of international Islamist terrorism**, particularly in Russia.
- **Developments in the domestic political situation** in Western European countries experiencing periods of instability, such as France and Germany, with elections scheduled for 2025 and potential Russian interference.
- **Political crisis developments** in Romania and Georgia.



Election Calendar

Dates to be confirmed or uncertain

- Australia**, by 17 May: federal elections
- Bangladesh**, late 2025: general elections
- Cameroon**, October: presidential election
- Canada**, by October: federal elections
- Central African Republic**, by December: general elections
- Guyana**, by late 2025: general elections
- Haiti**, by late 2025: referendum and elections to be announced
- Iraq**, by October 2025: legislative elections
- Ireland**, by 27 October: presidential election
- Ivory Coast**, October: presidential election
- Jamaica**, by November: general elections
- Moldova**, by 11 July: parliamentary elections
- Poland**, May: presidential election
- Singapore**, by 23 November : general elections
- Suriname**, May : general elections
- Tanzania**, October : general elections
- Togo**, May: presidential election (indirect)
- Trinidad and Tobago**, August: general elections
- Venezuela**, by late 2025: parliamentary elections

2025

January

- **Lebanon** (9th) Indirect presidential elections
- **Comoros** (12) Legislative elections
- **Croatia** (12th) 2nd round presidential elections
- **Belarus** (26th) Presidential election

February

- **India** (5th) Delhi legislative elections
- **Kosovo** (9th) Parliamentary elections
- **Ecuador** (9th) 1st round general elections
- **Togo** (15th) Senatorial elections
- **Comoros** (16th) Local elections
- **Germany** (23rd) Legislative elections

March

- **Tajikistan** (2nd, 28th) Parliamentary elections
- **Honduras** (9th) Presidential primaries

April

- **CAR** (6th) Legislative & local elections
- **Greenland** (6th) General elections
- **Gabon** (12th) Presidential elections
- **Ecuador** (13th) 2nd round general elections

May

- **Romania** (4th, 18th) Presidential elections
- **Albania** (11th) Legislative elections
- **Philippines** (12th) General elections
- **Poland** (18th) Presidential elections

June

- **Mexico** (1st) Judicial elections
- **Burundi** (5th) Legislative elections
- **Chili** (29th) Presidential primary and legislative elections

July

August

- **Bolivia** (17th) General elections

September

- **Norway** (8th) Parliamentary elections
- **Malawi** (16th) General elections
- **Seychelles** (27th) General elections
- **Germany** (28th) General elections

October

- **Argentina** (3rd, 26th) Legislative elections

November

- **United States** (4th) Legislative & gubernatorial elections
- **Chile** (16th) General elections
- **Argentina** (26th) Legislative elections
- **Honduras** (30th) Presidential elections

December

International Calendar

MUSLIM WORLD
Ramadan
28 February – 29 March

BRAZIL
COP 30
10-21 November


UNITED STATES
Donald Trump's inauguration
20 January

ENGLAND
Women's Rugby World Cup
22 August - 27 September

JAPAN
World Expo 2025 in Osaka
13 April - 30 October

MOROCCO
Africa Cup of Nations
21 December - 18 January

FRANCE
Artificial Intelligence Action Summit
10-11 February



Your international security partner




Information & Analysis

*Country profiles
Alerts 24/7
Customised Reports*

Training

*E-learning
Courses prior to travel
Crisis management drills*



Consultancy

*Business intelligence
Travel safety audit
Security risk management
ISO 31030 compliance advice*

Technology

*Tracking
Mobile app
SOS & Safety Check*

Operations

*Security Operations Centre 24/7
Assistance in high-risk zones
Crisis management support*